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Abstract
This paper studies optimal scal policies in a small open economy within a mon-
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countries due to consumption home bias; thus scal policy inuences ination and the
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pendent monetary policy, some variability in labour taxes is optimal. This is true even
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1 Introduction
This paper studies optimal scal policies in a small open economy within a monetary union.
In particular, we consider the choice of labour income taxes and new debt issuance when
monetary policy is exogenous, i.e. when the weight of the member country in the monetary
policy making process is small. Such a country nevertheless retains a powerful instrument
to inuence its domestic prices: scal policy. We show in this paper that an incentive to
change taxes, and hence domestic prices, arises from the fact that governments hold nominal
non-state-contingent assets.
The scal authority faces conicting objectives. On the one hand, the cost of raising
taxes is their distortionary e¤ect on production. This is a classic result going back to Lucas
and Stokey (1983). On the other hand, taxes can be used to raise domestic ination and
hence lower the real value of public debt in bad times, a result reminiscent of Chari et als
(1991) use of monetary policy to change ination.
The monetary union is composed of two countries with independent scal authorities. We
consider the case of a small open economy by taking the limit as the country size goes to zero.
Monetary policy, conducted at the union level, is assumed to be exogenous. Due to home bias,
consumption baskets di¤er across countries and so do price levels. The scal authority taxes
labour income and issues nominal non-state-contingent debt to nance exogenous public
spending; this provides an incentive to generate ination to lower the public debt burden.
The small country cannot choose monetary policy independently; however, it can use scal
policy to vary domestic ination. We consider optimal policy under commitment as in
Ramsey (1927). We characterise the welfare-maximising scal policy in this environment:
the implied responses to government spending changes and productivity shocks, as well as
the optimal volatility of taxes.
As opposed to Benigno and De Paoli (2010), we assume that monetary policy is exoge-
nous. In their model, the tax rate varies optimally to take advantage of the terms of trade
externality whenever home and foreign goods are complements or substitutes in consump-
tion. In the special case where the goods are independent in the agentsutility, taxes should
be smooth. Here, we focus on this special case to show that optimal tax variability rises
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if monetary policy is exogenous and public debt is nominal and non-state-contingent. Our
result applies to a small open economy with a xed exchange rate as well as to a monetary
union country. From the vantage point of a small open economy the two are identical. In
either case, monetary policy is unavailable and the tax rate is the only lever that the country
has to inuence domestic ination.
Galí and Monacelli (2008) and Ferrero (2009) solve for the optimal coordinated scal
and monetary policies in a monetary union. In contrast, we derive the optimal scal policy
without coordination under the assumption that monetary policy is exogenous. Given the
independence of the European Central Bank and the lack of a European scal institution,
we regard this setup as consistent with current policymaking arrangements in Europe.
Other research on scal policy in a monetary union concentrates on (optimal) simple
rules and typically assumes sticky prices. For instance, Duarte and Wolman (2008) analyse
the e¤ects of scal policy on ination and competitiveness for a given tax rule in a sticky-
price economy. Kirsanova et al (2007) consider optimal scal rules in the presence of price
rigidities and other frictions such as rule-of-thumb consumers.
More recently, Farhi and Werning (2014) study optimal transfers between members of
a currency union and compute how the welfare gain depends on the size and persistence
of shocks and the degree of openness. They focus on cooperative scal policy. Dmitriev
and Hoddenbagh (2015) show how, in a cooperative setup, cross-country transfers should be
designed for optimal risk sharing in a currency union. Under incomplete nancial markets
and if the trade elasticity is high, scal transfers can help to insure against country-specic
shocks. In contrast to these two contributions on optimal scal unions, we consider non-
cooperative scal policy from the perspective of a single currency union member.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline the model,
starting from a two-country model and then zooming in on the small open economy case.
Section 3 discusses optimal scal policies in the small open economy. We contrast the
monetary union model with nominal government debt with the e¢ cient benchmark of a
standalone country that has full control over its monetary policy, which as shown in Benigno
and De Paoli (2010) is equivalent to the small open economy case with access to state-
contingent debt. We also consider the e¤ect of varying model parameters capturing openness,
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the steady state debt ratio and the government spending share. Then Section 4 investigates
the e¤ect on the results of varying country size. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The economy is composed of two countries (denoted H and F ) that share the same currency
but have separate scal authorities. Monetary policy is conducted at the union level and is
assumed to be exogenous. Agents have a bias towards domestically produced goods, which
implies that the home and foreign consumption bundles and their prices di¤er. Financial
markets between home and foreign agents are complete. We start from a two-country model
where the countries di¤er in size. Then we discuss the small open economy case by letting
the size of the home country go to zero. The model structure is similar to Benigno and De
Paoli (2010); however, we assume that the countries belong to a monetary union and the
home government issues only nominal non-state-contingent bonds. We present the model
equations for the home country and relegate the foreign equilibrium conditions, which are
analogous, to the appendix.
2.1 Households
Preferences of home agents are summarised by:
E0
1X
t=0
t

ln ct   1
1 + 
lt
1+

, (1)
where 0 <  < 1 is the subjective discount factor, ct is the composite good (including both
domestic and foreign goods), lt is labour, and  is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour
supply to the real wage.
The composite good ct is dened as a Cobb-Douglas aggregate,
c =
cHc
1 
F
 (1  )1  , (2)
where  is the weight that determines the agentsbias towards domestic goods. As in Benigno
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and De Paoli (2010),  is a function of the relative size of the domestic economy with respect
to the rest of the world n and of the degree of openness ,
1   = (1  n). (3)
The more open the country (the greater is ), the lower is the degree of home bias. The
larger the country (the greater is n), the higher is the degree of home bias.
Given a decision on the composite consumption good c, the home households allocate
optimally the expenditure on domestic and foreign goods, by minimising the natural deni-
tion of the total expenditure Pc = PHcH +PF cF , subject to (2). This leads to the following
demand functions,
cH = 

PH
P
 1
c, cF = (1  )

PF
P
 1
c, (4)
where PH and PF are, respectively, the prices of home- and foreign-produced goods faced by
consumers in country H. Replacing cH and cF in (2), we obtain the following price index
for the composite consumption good in country H,
P = P HP
1 
F . (5)
The home households choose consumption, labour and bonds to maximise utility (1)
subject to the budget constraint given by
Ptct + EtfQt;t+1Dt;t+1g+Bt + PtTt  (1   t)Wtlt +Rt 1Bt 1 +Dt, (6)
where Bt are holdings of home government bonds, which cost one home currency unit today
and pay Rt currency units tomorrow, Rt being the nominal interest rate, set exogenously by
the union monetary authority. Further, Dt;t+1 are holdings of state-contingent bonds, traded
with the foreign households, which cost Qt;t+1 units of the home currency today and pay one
unit of home currency in a particular state tomorrow, Wtlt is nominal labour income, which
is taxed at rate  t, and Tt are lump-sum taxes expressed in consumption units. We rule out
Ponzi games by assuming limT!1Q0;T [BT + EtfQT;T+1DT;T+1g]  0.
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The rst order conditions of the householdsproblem with respect to labour, government
bonds and state-contingent bonds, are:
(1   t)wt = ctlt , (7)
1 = RtEt

ct=ct+1
t+1

, (8)
Qt;t+1 = 
ct=ct+1
t+1
, (9)
where wt = Wt=Pt is the real wage and t = Pt=Pt 1 is gross ination. Combining the
householdsrst order conditions for government bonds and state-contingent bonds, (8) and
(9), we obtain EtfQt;t+1g = 1Rt .
2.2 Firms
Production is linear in labour, which in turn is immobile across countries, such that
yH;t = Atlt. (10)
Firms choose labour to maximise prots yH;tpH;t   (1   {)wtlt, where { is a constant em-
ployment subsidy nanced with lump sum taxes. Using the production function (10), the
rmsdemand for labour is such that after-tax wages are equal to the marginal product of
labour, adjusted for the relative price of home-produced goods,
(1  {)wt = AtpH;t. (11)
Alternatively, combining the production function (10) with labour demand (11), we can state
that the wage bill, including the employment subsidy, equals revenues,
(1  {)wtlt = yH;tpH;t. (12)
For simplicity, we reduce the model by eliminating the real wage wt and labour lt. Combining
the householdslabour supply (7) with the rmslabour demand (11) and the production
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function (10) yields
1   t
1  {AtpH;t = ct(
yH;t
At
), (13)
which describes the optimality condition for production.
2.3 Prices
We dene the real exchange rate in the monetary union as St = P t =Pt, where P

t is the price
index for the composite consumption good in country F . Since demand elasticities are equal
across regions, the rms set the same price in H and in F in producer currency, i.e. the law
of one price holds. In a monetary union, the producer currency and the local currency are
the same, such that PH;t = P H;t or
pH;t =
pH;t
St
, (14)
where we have dened the relative prices pH;t = PHt =Pt and p

H;t = P
H
t =P

t .
Combining the home householdsrst order condition for state-contingent bonds with
its foreign equivalent yields the following risk-sharing condition, ctPt
ct+1Pt+1
=
ctP t
ct+1P

t+1
, whereby
the growth of the marginal utility of nominal consumption will be equalised across countries.
Dening  = c

0P

0
c0P0
as in Chari et al (2002), the risk sharing condition can be written as
St = 
ct
ct
. (15)
Starting from an initial steady state in which consumption and price levels are equal across
countries, i.e.  = 1, this implies that the consumption ratio at any point in time is equal
to the real exchange rate.
2.4 Government
The scal authority has to nance an exogenous stream of public expenditure gt, using
labour income taxes  t and issuing nominal government bonds B
g
t . Lump sum taxes Tt
are available only at the steady state and cannot be varied over the business cycle. The
domestic government budget constraint, in terms of the home composite consumption good,
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is as follows,
gt +
Rt 1b
g
t 1
t
= ( t   {)wtlt + bgt + Tt, (16)
where bgt = B
g
t =Pt are government bonds in real terms. We assume that the governments
preferences towards consumption goods are the same as those of the households. Hence,
given total government spending gt, public consumption of each individual good is given by
identical expressions to those obtained for private consumption in (4).
Following Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013), we set a constant employment subsidy, nanced
by lump-sum taxes, that makes the steady state e¢ cient. This implies that lump sum taxes
are pinned down by the relation Tt = {wtlt. Inserting this relation into the government
budget constraint (16) to replace lump sum taxes and eliminating the wage bill using (12),
we have
gt +
Rt 1b
g
t 1
t
=
 t
1  {yH;tpH;t + b
g
t . (17)
2.5 Market Clearing
There is a mass n of households in country H and a mass (1  n) of households in country
F . The market clearing condition for the good produced in H is obtained by combining
private and public demands at home and abroad, weighted by the respective country size,
yH;t = (cH;t + gH;t) +
1  n
n
 
cH;t + g

H;t

= p 1H;t (ct + gt) +
1  n
n

 
pH;t
 1
(ct + g

t ) ,
where we have substituted cH;t and cH;t using (4) and gH;t and g

H;t using the analogous
demand functions from the government sector. Setting pH;t =
pH;t
St
from the pricing condition
(14), and replacing the home bias parameters  and , this becomes:
pH;tyH;t = [1  (1  n)] (ct + gt) + (1  n)St (ct + gt ) . (18)
Asset market clearing requires
nDt + (1  n)Dt = 0, Bgt = Bt. (19)
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Combining the householdsand government budget constraints yields the aggregate resource
constraint,
n (ct + gt) + (1  n)St (ct + gt ) = nwtlt + (1  n)Stwt lt . (20)
2.6 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is described by the following interest rate rule,
Rt
R
=

Ut
U

, (21)
where Ut = 
n
t (

t )
1 n is union-wide ination and  > 1. As shown by Ferrero (2009),
strict ination targeting is optimal in a currency union where monetary and scal policies
are coordinated.
2.7 Small Open Economy
The small open economy case is derived by letting the home country size n go to zero, such
that 1    =  and  = 0. The price levels in countries H and F , equation (5) and its
foreign counterpart, reduce to
p1 H;t p

F;t = 1, p

F;t = 1. (22)
The price level in country H depends on prices of domestically produced goods and the price
of imports, where the weights depend only on the countrys openness . Combining the price
levels (22) with the law of one price for foreign goods (42), we nd
p1 H;t S

t = 1. (23)
Usually, a countrys terms of trade is dened as the price of exports divided by the price of
imports (both expressed in domestic currency). Here, we follow the convention in the open
economy literature of dening the terms of trade as the price of domestic goods pH;t over the
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price of imports pF;t, both expressed in terms of the home consumption basket, i.e.
ToTt =
pH;t
StpF;t
=
pH;t
St
.
In the demand functions for home and foreign goods, setting 1    =  and  = 0 and
substituting out the foreign prices pH;t and p

F;t using (14) and p

F;t = pF;t=St, respectively,
gives
pH;tyH;t = (1  ) (ct + gt) + St(ct + gt ), (24)
yF;t = c

t + g

t . (25)
Government spending and log productivity at = lnAt follow autoregressive processes,
gt =
 
1  g

g + ggt 1 + "g;t, (26)
at = (1  a) a+ aat 1 + "a;t. (27)
We abstract from foreign shocks, which in the small open economy model implies that foreign
variables are constant. Moreover, the nominal interest rate, determined through the foreign
Euler equation, is constant at R = 1

. The resulting system of equilibrium conditions is
summarised in Table 1.
[ insert Table 1 here ]
The steady state is dened as an equilibrium in which the exogenous variables At and gt are
constant. In particular, we set A = 1 and g
yH
=  . We consider a symmetric zero-ination
steady state where S =  = 1. Symmetry between the countries is characterised by c = c,
g = g, yH = yF and initial holdings of state-contingent assets are zero, d0 = D0=P0 = 0.
1
Under these considerations, the production choice (13), the government budget constraint
(17) and the market clearing condition (24) at the steady state can be used to derive a
recursive system of three equations in c, yH ,  , given calibrated values for , , {,   and
1See the online appendix for details.
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b = Rbg=yH ,
 =
  + (1  ) b
1 +   + (1  ) b , (28)
yH =

1
1   
 1
1+
, (29)
c = y H . (30)
Given that the labour tax is the only steady state distortion in this model, it is clear that
an employment subsidy equal to the tax rate on labour income, { =  , makes the steady
state e¢ cient.
3 Optimal Fiscal Policy in the Small Open Economy
In the following, we derive optimal scal policies in the small open economy under two
scenarios. First, we consider the monetary union case as outlined above. This implies that
the real depreciation rate is a constraint for the policy maker, tying the domestic ination
rate inversely to the change in the real exchange rate. Second, we contrast this with the
case of a standalone country that is not part of a monetary union. The nominal exchange
rate is exible and monetary policy can be set freely to pin down the real depreciation rate,
St=St 1. In both cases we characterise optimal allocations as in Ramsey (1927), which are
welfare-maximising allocations derived subject to the constraints given by the equilibrium
conditions. We then calibrate the model and analyse the dynamics arising in response to
government spending and productivity shocks. This is done by linearising the rst order
conditions of the Ramsey planner around the deterministic steady state. Finally, we study
the optimal tax variability in the two models for di¤erent parameter constellations.
3.1 Monetary Union Case: Exogenous Monetary Policy
The small open economy model of the previous section is reduced further for the policy
problem. In particular, we substitute out the prices t, St and pH;t, as well as the policy
instrument  t. We eliminate the tax rate  t by combining the optimal production choice
(13) with the government budget constraint. We also eliminate the domestic ination rate
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in the government budget constraint using the real exchange rate identity under constant
foreign ination, t = St 1=St. Then, we use the risk sharing condition to replace St in the
government budget constraint and in the market clearing condition with ct=c. Finally, we
eliminate the real price of home goods pH;t using the price index, i.e. pH;t = ( ctc )
=( 1).
Under these considerations, the Ramsey problem becomes
max
fct;yH;t;bgt g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t

ln ct   1
1 + 
(
yH;t
At
)1+

subject to the government budget constraint and the market clearing condition,
gt +
bgt 1ct
ct 1
=
1
1  { (
ct
c
)

 1yH;t   ct(yH;t
At
)1+ + bgt , (31)
(
ct
c
)

 1yH;t = (1  ) (ct + gt) + cty

F
c
, (32)
for all t, and bg 1, c 1 given. Denote by 1t and 2t the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints
(31) and (32), respectively. The Lagrangian problem is
max
fct;yH;t;bgt g1t=0
min
fat;btg1t=0
L = E0
1X
t=0
t

ln ct   1
1 + 
(
yH;t
At
)1+
+at

gt +
bgt 1ct
ct 1
  1
1  { (
ct
c
)

 1yH;t + ct(
yH;t
At
)1+   bgt

+bt

(
ct
c
)

 1yH;t   (1  ) (ct + gt)  cty

F
c

.
After some algebra, we obtain the following rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem,
1  atgt + (1  )btgt =

at
1  {   bt

1
  1(
ct
c
)

 1yH;t, (33)
[at(1 + )ct   1] (
yH;t
At
)1+ =

at
1  {   bt

(
ct
c
)

 1yH;t, (34)
atct = Et

at+1ct+1
	
. (35)
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3.2 Standalone Country Case: Endogenous Monetary Policy
If the small open economy is not part of a monetary union, the real depreciation rate is
no longer pinned down by real allocations and therefore is not a constraint for the Ramsey
planner. Instead, by controlling monetary policy, the policy maker can choose the ination
rate to complete the markets and make the government debt state-contingent. This is
because ination is costless: there is no price rigidity either in the form of price stickiness,
price adjustment costs, or a xed nominal exchange rate.
Benigno and De Paoli (2010) show that the small open economy model with nominal
debt and costless ination is equivalent to a model in which the government is able to trade
state-contingent assets. Debt dynamics play no role and we can abstract from ination and
monetary policy. The equations summarising the allocation are given in Table 2.
[ insert Table 2 here ]
In the following, we parameterise the model and show the optimal impulse responses to
productivity shocks and to government spending shocks. We compare the optimal dynamics
of a monetary union country to those in a standalone country.
3.3 Parameterisation
Having found the rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem, we linearise them around
the deterministic steady state and consider persistent shocks to government spending and
productivity. In choosing the parameter values, we largely follow Benigno and De Paoli
(2010). The parameterisation is given in Table 3.
[ insert Table 3 here ]
The discount factor  has the value 0:99, which is conventional for a quarterly frequency as
it implies a steady state interest rate of 4 (1=   1) = 0:04 or 4% per annum. The constant
of relative risk aversion  is set to 1 corresponding to logarithmic consumption utility. The
elasticity of marginal (dis-)utility of labour  is set to 0:47. The elasticity of substitution
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between home- and foreign-produced composite goods is set to unity, di¤erently from Benigno
and De Paoli (2010). We thus assume that H and F goods bundles are independent in the
agentsutility. The degree of openness  is calibrated at 0:24, such that the import share in
GDP is 24%. The government is assumed to consume one fth of domestic output in steady
state, i.e.   = 0:2, which corresponds roughly to the average government spending share in
the US. The standard deviation and persistence of the productivity shocks are consistent with
Gali and Monacelli (2005), while the shock process for government spending is calibrated as
in Lubik and Schorfheide (2005).
The Ramsey steady state under this parameterisation is as follows. Ination and relative
prices are all equal to unity,  = pH = S = ToT = 1. Production is yH = 1:16, while four
fths of production goes to private consumption, such that c = 0:93. To nance a government
debt ratio roughly equal to 60% of GDP, b = 0:6, the optimal steady state labour tax rate
is around 0:17. By itself, this labour taxes would distort production; therefore, employment
should be subsidised at a rate of 17 percent.
3.4 Optimal Dynamics
Recall that the incentives of the scal authorities in our small monetary union country
are twofold. First, it wants to smooth tax distortions over time, which suggests that tax
variability should be low. Second, taxes can be used to generate ination. When government
debt is high in nominal terms, ination reduces its real value and is therefore desirable.
As emphasised in Benigno and De Paoli (2010), there may be a third incentive due to
the so-called terms of trade externality. Whenever home and foreign goods are substitutes
or complements in utility, there is an incentive to manipulate the terms of trade using
scal policy, such that home consumption can be raised without a corresponding increase
in production. We eliminate this channel by studying the knife-edge case where home and
foreign goods are independent in utility, which requires that the trade elasticity, i.e. the
elasticity of substitution between the home and foreign composite good, is unity.
Figures 1 and 2 exhibit impulse response functions to a government spending shock and a
productivity shock, respectively. We analyse "bad" shocks, that is, an increase in government
spending and a reduction of productivity. The dynamic responses under the optimal plan
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have the same sign in both models, but there is a di¤erence in magnitude, which we explain
further below. Notice that the assumption of log consumption utility, coupled with complete
risk sharing across countries, implies that the dynamics of consumption and the real exchange
rate St are identical.
[ insert Figure 1 here ]
Consider a persistent increase in government spending in a small monetary union country
with only nominal non-state-contingent public debt. We observe a rise in domestic pro-
duction to satisfy the increased demand, while private consumption is crowded out. The
increase in government outlays is nanced partly through higher taxes and partly through
an increase in government debt. Due to home bias in government consumption, the terms
of trade improve, i.e. the relative price of domestically produced goods increases. The real
exchange rate (or the relative price of consumption) appreciates; home consumption becomes
more expensive relative to foreign consumption.
Turning to the responses in the model with state-contingent debt (i.e. the standalone
economy with endogenous monetary policy), we note that consumption, the real exchange
rate and the terms of trade respond less strongly to the shock, while home output responds
more strongly to the shock. The existence of complete markets allows the government to
nance the rise in spending with state-contingent bonds, without the need to raise taxes.
[ insert Figure 2 here ]
Figure 2 displays the optimal dynamics following a negative productivity shock. Ination
rises on impact, while production in the home country falls. Consumption falls, too, and
the real exchange rate appreciates accordingly. Domestically produced goods become dearer
(the terms of trade improve). The fall in production is greater than the rise in the terms of
trade, such that home revenues decline. In the monetary union model, government debt bgt
drops initially, while government spending has not changed. Thus, to maintain government
revenues given a lower tax base, the optimal tax rate rises.
In the model with state-contingent public debt, the impulse responses of the real variables
are very similar to the monetary union model with nominal non-state-contingent debt, which
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suggests that - with the help of the tax instrument and domestic ination - the optimal
Ramsey policy can almost complete the markets in response to productivity shocks.
3.5 Optimal Tax and Ination Variability
The impulse response analysis of the previous section suggested that some variability in
labour taxes is optimal in a small country that is part of a monetary union. In the following,
we present the results of a simple simulation exercise.2 Table 5 presents the optimal standard
deviation of the tax rate (in absolute terms and relative to the standard deviation of output),
in the benchmark model of a monetary union country with nominal debt.
How does the optimal variability depend on parameter values? To answer this question,
we analyse variations in the degree of openness , the steady state share of government
spending  , and the steady state debt ratio b.
[ insert Table 5 here ]
In a monetary union country whose government holds only nominal debt, taxes exhibit con-
siderable volatility, both in absolute and in relative terms. For all parameter perturbations
considered, the taxes are more variable than output. This is a result of the nominal rigidity
that the monetary union membership imposes. With an independent monetary policy, there
would be no need to inuence domestic ination via tax policies, because this could be done
directly by adjusting the money supply. Then, taxes could be held constant as in Chari et
al (1991); it would be optimal to smooth taxes completely, so as to minimise the associated
production distortion. Consider rst the benchmark parameterization. The optimal variance
of the tax rate is around 10, while the variance of ination is lower at 7 in absolute terms.
The tax rate is one and a half times as volatile as output; ination is slightly more volatile
than output.
Optimal tax and ination volatility are decreasing in the degree of openness and therefore
2Notice that in our model simulations we consider only domestic shocks to productivity and to govern-
ment spending. Therefore, the absolute volatilites reported here should not be compared with Benigno and
de Paoli (2010), who also include shocks to foreign consumption.
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increasing in the consumption home bias parameter, .3 As the degree of openness increases,
the government loses freedom to a¤ect ination, so it prefers to keep taxes as smooth as
possible (with  = 1 ination is completely determined abroad, so optimal ination volatility
actually approaches 0). On the contrary, for small , the government raises taxes in bad
times to induce ination and hence reduce the burden of nominal debt.
When we increase the steady state share of government spending  , the standard devi-
ation of taxes falls both in absolute terms and relative to output. This can be attributed
to the rise in the steady state tax rate that is needed to nance the additional government
spending. Given a higher tax rate, any change in taxes induces more ination volatility, so
there is less need to change taxes so much.
The variability of taxes is not very sensitive to the steady state debt ratio b. As the
required steady state tax rate rises, the optimal tax volatility falls slightly. Ination volatility
hardly changes in response to perturbations in the steady state debt ratio and stays roughly
the same as the variability of output. This is also true for negative values of b, i.e. when
the government holds nominal assets. In such circumstances, the government would like to
have deation, but it still needs to increase taxes to nance the negative shock (since this
is the only instrument available) and this induces ination. This nding suggests a role for
choosing a di¤erent composition of the public debt/assets portfolio, which is however beyond
the scope of the present paper.4
4 The Role of Country Size
We now explore the role of country size for optimal scal policy in the monetary union
country with nominal non-state-contingent debt. To this end, we analyse the two-country
model with a given monetary policy rule reacting to union-wide ination as in (21), and
increase the relative size of the home country from our benchmark parameterization n = 0,
the small open economy case, to n = 1, the closed economy case. We also allow for di¤erent
3Recall from (3) that the degree of home bias is inversely related to openness.
4We conjecture that it would be optimal for the government to issue nominal debt and hold ination-
linked assets, similar to Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004), who derive the optimal maturity
structure in a closed economy. When the government issues long-term debt and holds short-term assets,
negative shocks induce a higher interest rate and hence decrease the market value of long-term debt.
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monetary policy rules by changing the parameter . As before, we report the volatility of
the labour tax  t and of ination t in the Ramsey allocation, both in absolute value and
relative to output volatility. The results are shown at the bottom of Table 5.
As explained above, the optimal steady state tax rate is not a¤ected by country size
and remains at 17%. Optimal tax volatility increases from 1:5 times that of output in the
small open economy to around 1:7 times that of output in the closed economy. At the
same time, relative ination volatility in the Ramsey economy falls from above 1 in the
small open economy (n = 0) to around one fourth in the closed economy (n = 1). This
result makes intuitive sense: In the open economy, the absence of the exchange rate as
an adjustment mechanism implies, as argued above, that tax changes can a¤ect domestic
ination and thus the value of government debt through international relative prices. The
nominal rigidity implied by the currency union leads to optimal tax volatility being higher
than in a standalone country, which can engineer surprise ination through an independent
monetary policy. This benecial e¤ect of the currency union becomes weaker as the home
country size n increases, and disappears completely in the closed economy. When n goes
to zero, monetary policy from the union perspective does not take into account the small
open economy problem but when n is di¤erent from zero, then monetary policy at the union
level adjusts the interest rate in response to union-wide ination, Ut . The result is a fall
in optimal ination volatility as the country size increases. As ination cannot be used as
easily in a larger country, government spending shocks generate larger responses in the tax
rate, and thus tax volatility is larger for larger values of n.
However, this crucially depends on the monetary policy rule, when n > 0. When the
rule is not so sensitive to ination (small ), monetary policy induces a lot more ination
volatility, without a major impact on tax variability, which allows for more consumption
smoothing and a higher welfare. This suggests that the optimal monetary policy would
induce more ination volatility, following Chari et al. (1991).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse optimal scal policy in a small open economy that is part of a
monetary union. Government spending must be nanced with distortionary taxes on labour
income and nominal non-state-contingent debt. Lump sum taxes or state-contingent gov-
ernment bonds are unavailable. When setting tax rates, the government must trade o¤ two
e¤ects. First, taxes distort the production-consumption decision of the households, leading
to a misallocation of resources. Second, taxes a¤ect domestic prices and thus ination, be-
cause home bias makes consumption baskets di¤er across countries. Ination is helpful to
reduce the real value of public debt when a bad shock hits, i.e. when government spending
is high or when productivity is low.
We show that tax variability is substantially higher in an economy that is part of a
monetary union than in a standalone country that has control over its monetary policy. In
the former case, more tax volatility is optimal to induce ination in bad times. In the latter
case, there is an alternative instrument to generate ination (monetary policy), so the tax
smoothing incentive is the dominant objective of scal policy.
The results of this paper suggest that exploring the optimal public debt composition
between nominal and real non-state-contingent instruments deserves attention in future re-
search. As noticed, this will also depend on the coordination between the monetary policy
set at the union level and the scal policies conducted at each individual country.
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Appendix: Equilibrium Conditions in Country F
In country F , the representative agent maximises
E0
1X
t=0
t

ln ct  
1
1 + 
(lt )
1+

, (36)
where the consumption bundle c is dened as Cobb-Douglas aggregate,
c =
(cH)
 (cF )
1 
()

(1  )1  , (37)
with  = n. We have the following demands in country F for the home- and foreign-
produced goods,
cH = 


P H
P 
 1
c, cF = (1  )

P F
P 
 1
c. (38)
Using the demand functions (38), we replace cH and c

F in the natural denition of the
composite expenditure P c = P Hc

H + P

F c

F to get the associated foreign price index
P  = (P H)
 (P F )
1  . (39)
The foreign production function and labour demand are, respectively,
yF;t = A

t l

t , (40)
(1  {)wt = AtpF;t. (41)
In a monetary union, the producer currency and the local currency are the same, such that
the currency price of foreign goods is the same in the two countries, P F;t = PF;t, which can
be written as
pF;t = Stp

F;t, (42)
where we have dened the relative prices pF;t = P Ft =Pt and p

F;t = P
F
t =P

t .
Demand functions for the di¤erentiated foreign-produced goods, at home and abroad,
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are
yF;t =
n
1  n (cF;t + gF;t) +
 
cF;t + g

F;t

=
n
1  n(1  )p
 1
F;t (ct + gt) + (1  )
 
pF;t
 1
(ct + g

t ) ,
where we have substituted the demand functions (38) and the corresponding demands from
the foreign government. Setting pF;t = StpF;t from the pricing condition (42), this becomes:
pF;ty

F;t = n
1
St
(ct + gt) + (1  n) (ct + gt ) . (43)
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Figure 1: Optimal Responses to a Government Spending Shock
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The gure shows the dynamic responses (multiplied by 100) to a positive one-standard deviation shock to
government spending under the optimal policy in the small open economy. The dashed line corresponds
to a monetary union country with nominal non-state-contingent government debt. The continuous line
corresponds to a standalone country with state-contingent government debt.
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Figure 2: Optimal Responses to a Productivity Shock
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The gure shows the dynamic responses (multiplied by 100) to a negative one-standard deviation productivity
shock under the optimal policy in the small open economy. The dashed line corresponds to a monetary
union country with nominal non-state-contingent government debt. The continuous line corresponds to a
standalone country with state-contingent government debt.
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Table 1. Small Open Economy in a Monetary Union with Nominal Debt
St
St 1 =
1
t
Real exchange rate identity
gt +
bgt 1
t
=  t1 {yH;tpH;t + b
g
t Government budget constraint
1 = p1 H;t S

t Price index
ct = c
St Risk sharing
1  t
1 { AtpH;t = ct(
yH;t
At
) Production
pH;tyH;t = (1  ) (ct + gt) + StyF Market clearing
Table 2. Small Open Economy with State-Contingent Debt
1 = p1 H;t S

t Price index
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St Risk sharing
1  t
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At
) Production
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Table 3. Two-country Monetary Union with Nominal Debt
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RtEt
n
ct
ct+1
1
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o
Bond Euler equation
St
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1  t
1 { AtpH;t = ct(
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) Production H
1 t
1 {A

t p

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
t (
yF;t
At
) Production F
1 = pH;t(Stp

F;t)
1  Price index H
1 = (pH;t=St)
p
(1 )
F;t Price index F
ct = c
St Risk sharing
pH;tyH;t = (ct + gt) + (1  )St(ct + gt ) Market clearing good H
pH;tyH;t = (1  ) (ct + gt) + StyF Market clearing good F
Rt
R =

Ut
U

Monetary policy
Ut = 
n
t (

t )
1 n Union-wide ination
gt +
bgt 1
t
=  t1 {yH;tpH;t + b
g
t Government budget constraint
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Table 4. Benchmark Parameterization
Parameter Value Name
Structural Parameters
 0.99 discount factor
 0.47 inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply to the real wage
 0.24 degree of openness
  0.2 steady state government spending share
b 1 (0.6) steady state government debt ratio
Shock processes
std(at) 0.0071 standard deviation of productivity shock
std(gt) 0.0062 standard deviation of government spending shock
a 0.66 persistence of productivity shock
g 0.94 persistence of government spending shock
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Table 5. Volatilities under the Ramsey Policy
Tax Rate Ination
 (%) var(b t) var(b t)var(byH;t) var(t) var(t)var(byH;t)
Openness  = 0 17 17.16 1.70 12.06 1.19
 = 0:24 17 9.95 1.51 7.04 1.07
 = 0:4 17 6.52 1.41 4.39 0.95
 = 0:6 17 3.48 1.26 1.94 0.70
 = 0:8 17 1.80 1.01 0.48 0.27
 = 0:999 17 1.74 0.85 0.00 0.00
Govt spending   = 0 0.6 23.14 1.95 6.41 0.54
  = 0:2 17 9.95 1.51 7.04 1.07
  = 0:3 23 6.29 1.33 7.38 1.57
  = 0:4 29 3.88 1.17 7.69 2.32
Debt ratio b = 1 ( 1) 16 10.56 1.56 7.06 1.04
b= 1 (0:6) 17 9.95 1.51 7.04 1.07
b = 1 (1) 17 9.80 1.50 7.04 1.07
b = 1 (1:25) 18 9.71 1.49 7.04 1.08
Country size n = 0; = 1:02 17 9.95 1.51 7.04 1.07
n = 0; = 1:5 17 9.95 1.51 7.04 1.07
n = 0; = 2 17 9.95 1.51 7.04 1.07
n = 0:5; = 1:02 17 13.59 1.61 8.54 1.01
n = 0:5; = 1:5 17 13.58 1.60 3.27 0.39
n = 0:5; = 2 17 13.54 1.60 2.51 0.30
n = 1; = 1:02 17 17.61 1.70 16.92 1.64
n = 1; = 1:5 17 17.52 1.70 2.70 0.26
n = 1; = 2 17 17.43 1.70 1.05 0.10
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